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Abstract
In recent decades, the promotion of policies that are environmentally friendly has
become an important goal in U.S. foreign policy. One way that the United States has
influence over protecting the environment is through the policies attached to projects
funded by the multilateral development banks (MDBs). This gives the U.S. the ability to
indirectly fund projects in developing countries. Using data provided by the United States
Treasury, I examined U.S. voting decisions on projects from 2004 to 2011. These votes
come from multiple development banks including the World Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development
Bank (AfDB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). I
examined how the United States has behaved on lending projects, and what this means
for U.S. environmental protection and foreign policy. What I found was that in general,
environmental factors do play a significant role in predicting how the United States votes
in MDBs.
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I.

Introduction
Environmental protection is undeniably a global responsibility. As the world

grows while resources shrink, concern for the environment and climate change are highly
influencing action on the international stage. In comparison to other issues, such as
human rights offenses committed by oppressive regimes which can be considered internal
matters of sovereign nations, environmental issues are not so easily contained. It is far
more difficult to convince policy makers and leaders around the world that detrimental
environmental practices committed internally within the borders of one country do not
have external repercussions. After all, what good would it be for Germany to enact clean
air laws if the winds being blown in from the north are highly polluted by countries with
no such regulations? Or what point would the United States have in implementing laws to
keep river waters clean if upstream Canada was throwing waste into the same river?
There is a high level of international interdependence regarding environmental issues;
what happens in one part of the world is bound to have an effect on the region and
ultimately on the rest of the planet.
While the U.S. clamors to be a leader in environmental protection – as it tries to
be a leader in virtually every other area – it cannot be ignored that in order to find
solutions to global issues, a global approach must be taken that is inclusive in addressing
the concerns of all players involved. Within multilateral organizations, however, not all
governments have the same amount of influence. Even though there is inequity in
influence, membership in multilateral organizations provides countries an opportunity to
make decisions together. The particular types of multilateral organizations that were
examined in this thesis are multilateral development banks (MDBs). Even though the

U.S. has a massive toolbox full of resources at its disposal to address environmental
issues, and it can influence environmental protection through its policy on lending in the
MDBs in a very different way from bilateral strategies. The banks included in this
analysis were the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development
Bank (AfDB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Within these seven major
international financial organizations several lending windows were examined, including
the four major lending windows of the World Bank.
MDBs offer the United States, as well as any other participating country, a shield
protecting them from the harsh eye of public scrutiny if they happen to vote in favor of a
project or country that is contradictory to what it might say ―on the record‖ for the
media’s ears. Does the United States put its money where its mouth is when it comes to
making decisions in MDBs? Or does it act strategically when making decisions within
the MDBs? Recently, changes to U.S. law required voting records of U.S. representatives
to be published. Although the U.S. claims to be a strong supporter and leader in
environmental protection, has it historically voted to support this statement in the MDBs?
And if it does not, what factors might have influenced its voting behavior?
The main research question addressed in this study is to what extent is U.S. votes
in MDBs influenced by a recipient country’s environmental performance or
environmental factors in general? Even broader, what factors are influential in
determining U.S. decisions in MDBs in general? Is the U.S. really willing to fund any
loan to any country as long as it has positive environmental impacts? Or are there other
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influences it takes into consideration? A leading analyst of international organizations
claims that the World Bank is ―a source of funds to be offered to US friends or denied to
US enemies‖ (Parks and Tierney, 2004, p.4). This begs the question of whether the U.S.
is more likely to support loans to its friends rather than to enemies even if the
environmental impact is questionable.
The first section will be a literature review examining the effectiveness of
multilateral aid, how effective multilateral development banks have been in terms of
environmental projects, and U.S. foreign policy and the environment. The second section
will go over the methodology used, what variables I will be examining, and what I expect
to find. Section three will include the research and data interpretation of my findings.
Section four will include an analysis of the data followed by sections five and six which
will explain results and conclude this study and examine areas of further research,
respectively.

II.

Literature Review

Defining Multilateralism and Multilateral Development Banks
Throughout international relations (IR) literature, multilateralism has been
defined in a number of different ways, although all definitions share a common thread.
Keohane defines multilateralism as the coordination of national policies in groups of
three or more states using ad hoc arrangements or institutions (Keohane, 1990). Ruggie
goes one step further in defining multilateralism by adding that multilateral institutions
operate under certain principles (Ruggie, 1992). Combining the two definitions,
multilateralism can be defined as referring to the coordination of relations among three or
more states in accordance with certain principles through the use of ad hoc arrangements
6

or institutions. Additionally, multilateralism is characterized by rules of state action for
mutual long-term benefit of participating actors (Ruggie, 1992; Braaten, 2012). Two
major defining factors of multilateral institutions are the participation and membership of
three or more actors and common principles or goals between the actors that bind them
together. Countries that seek membership in multilateral institutions often seek long-term
gain from participation as well as strengthened relations between members. Although
countries share common goals, there are no two countries that ever join a multilateral
organization for the exact same reason (Sherk, 2008). Reasons for participation vary from
country to country, and although differences abound in reasons for joining, participatory
countries still share a commonality in progressing the mission and values of the
multilateral organization that they choose to join.
States can participate in either bilateral or multilateral means when conducting
international affairs. Bilateral relations are conducted between two participants only
while multilateral relations are conducted by three or more participants. In a bilateral
relationship, foreign aid or resources can be given directly from one country to another.
Multilateral relationships utilize a middle man type of organization, to funnel the money
and resources indirectly to specific countries. From there, members of the MDBs,
working with staff members and the leadership of the MDBs, decide how that money is
spent and where it goes. An example of this is using an organization such as the World
Bank to provide loans and grants to certain countries. Using the World Bank and the
United States as an example, the U.S. provides money to the World Bank as a
participating member of the organization and as such, indirectly provides aid to countries
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through projects funded by the World Bank rather than directly to that particular country
bilaterally.
Literature suggests that there is a subset of politicians and economists that
question the role of multilateral aid and institutions in contemporary society. Even today,
bilateralism is a more dominant form of aid than multilateral (Sherk, 2008). Despite their
relative historical success, the resiliency of multilateral organizations is being tested now
more than ever (Sherk, 2008). According to Sherk, the most dominant modern issue with
multilateral organizations is a lack of voice for developing countries (2008). The
structure of influence in these organizations is highly weighed in favor of more powerful,
developed countries. So it is no surprise that a country like the United States would
choose to participate in a multilateral organization. And although bilateralism dominates
as a form of relationship management, there are several reasons that an organization
would choose a multilateral structure over a bilateral one. A neoliberal view of why a
country would choose to partake in a multilateral institution is because they facilitate
cooperation among members, thereby reducing costs for projects among members and
providing them with a forum through which states can interact and use each other as
resources (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). By providing states with a medium of
communication, it is expected that cooperation will increase.
Multilateral organizations allow states to come together and pursue common
interests and initiatives. Through multilateral organizations, collective action is
encouraged and states can address issues that they may not be capable of addressing as
individuals. By pooling together their efforts and resources into one multilateral
organization, certain global issues such as the environment or climate change can be
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better addressed. While neoliberals believe that the creation of a multilateral organization
such as regional development banks can be used to shape the international agenda and
positions of power, a realist point of view would contend the opposite (Mearsheimer,
1994-95). Instead of multilateral organizations influencing states and increasing
cooperation and global participation, a realist would argue that multilateral organizations
are just a reflection of real power distributions in the world and that the more dominant
and powerful states influence the multilateral organizations the most (Mearsheimer,
1994-95). It can also be argued, however, that the organizations are used to spread
international norms and customs (Finnermore 1993). This could be particularly true for
major multilateral development banks and their environmental oversight procedures.
After one major multilateral development bank, the World Bank, began to seriously take
a project’s environmental impact into consideration and began conducting environmental
analyses, many other organizations began to do the same.
Moving from multilateral organizations to multilateral development banks
specifically, Sarah Babb defines multilateral development banks as ―multilateral
organizations, in the business of economic development, and behave primarily as banks‖
(2009, p.6). They are financed and controlled by many governments of the world and
share the purpose of providing finances to third-world countries for economic
development (Babb, 2009). Multilateral development banks are based on international
agreements that establish the creation of such an institution to support the development
objectives of those members who are in less-developed countries (Sherk, 1993).
According to Sherk, the MDBs are responsible for closing the large success gap between
major capital markets and finance development projects in the Third World (1993).
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Additionally, they act as advisors to developing members and provide resources for them
as well. Prior to the creation of MDBs, with the first being the World Bank in 1944,
developing countries depended primarily on bilateral aid and private capital flows,
although those proved to be inadequate to address the growing demands of developing
countries, especially of the poorest governments (Sherk, 1993).
It is this type of multilateral organization that was examined in this study. The
principal multilateral development institutions of today were established decades ago
after the end of the Second World War with the strong support of the United States and
the United Kingdom (Sherk, 2008). They were created to ensure the stability of an
economic system that was capable of withstanding international trade and payment
pressures. The creation of regional development banks, Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development Bank (AfDB),
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), mixed with the
initial multilateral institutions such as the World Bank are what make up the current
international economic framework (Sherk, 2008). As stated previously, these five MDBs
in addition to the GEF and the IFAD were considered in this analysis.
Although all of these MDBs are committed to international development, they all
vary in mandates. For example, the majority of MDBs from the World Bank to the IADB
are mandated to agree that decisions on projects will be made solely on economic
considerations, while the EBRD has a clear political mandate, stating that it would
support projects that promote democratization and an open market economy (Strand and
Zappile, 2014). As stated previously, a defining factor of multilateral organizations is the
achievement of some long-term goal, or common values of its members. In regional

10

MDBs, members are connected through the common goal of reaching economic success
for their region or in advancing the mission of a particular mandate, such as the EBRD.
The U.S. and MDBs
Although there are general benefits in participating in multilateral organizations
that can be applied to any country, the United States has particularly unique reasons that
support participation in multilateral organizations. One significant examination of how
successful the role of the United States has been in advancing its foreign policy agenda
through multilateral development banks was conducted by the U.S. Treasury in 1982
(Sherk, 2008). The results of the study indicated that U.S. involvement in MDBs was a
significant contributor to the country’s success in addressing the goals of its foreign
policy agenda such as advancing U.S. interest in humanitarianism as well as long-term
political and strategic interests. Although the United States does gain from its
involvement in multilateral development banks, there are many concerns with its position
of power as a major stakeholder in several of the banks. It has recently been argued that
the effectiveness of multilateral organizations have been compromised due to the
pressure and control of prominent donors, particularly the United States (Fleck and Kilby,
2006).The U.S. is often accused of attempting to propose several changes to operations
and policies in the MDBs for its own benefit rather than showing how these changes will
actually aid in the development of the global community (Sherk, 2008). Others are afraid
that U.S. power in these organizations will be diminished and ineffective because other
members will begin to mistrust the U.S., hence rendering their position of power useless.
Additionally, the United States has been viewed as having a ―lone ranger‖ type of attitude
in its role in the MDBs. Oftentimes the United States finds itself isolated in situations
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because of its approach in decision-making and consensus-building in the banks (Sherk,
2008).
While the majority of literature suggests that the United States plays a critical and
influential role in development banks, there is a growing sector in contemporary literature
that suggests the power of the United States in multilateral institutions is fading
(McKeown, 2009; Schoultz, 1982; Sherk, 2008). As developing member states find their
voices in MDBs and take a stronger stance on issues, there is a growing dissatisfaction
with the goals and operations of many of the banks (Sherk, 2008). Due to the strain that is
starting to appear in these institutions due to tension between developing and developed
member states, Sherk believes that it is unlikely that the U.S. will maintain as strong of a
position of power over the banks (2008).
Even with the looming threat of decreased power, however, when compared to
other donors the United States still holds significant power due to the banks’ designs to
be responsive to the needs of their donors as well its unique position in its willingness to
abandon the development banks at any time (Lavelle, 2011; Babb, 2009). This means that
in order to keep the U.S. on as a donor, banks must placate it in order to avoid conflict
(Babb, 2009). Kilby found in 2013 that the United States influences both high-profile
structural adjustment programs as well as day-to-day investment project disbursement
decisions, and that a simple reallocation of voting shares is not enough to ensure that
these banks are restructured to lessen U.S. influence. Because the World Bank and other
development banks award large financial contributors with considerable power over their
procedures and operations, literature on the U.S. role in multilateral development banks
suggests that the U.S. wields a significant amount of influence in these banks (Babb,
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2009; Sherk, 2008). The U.S. is the donor with the most control over the largest share of
votes in the World Bank, as well as a significant vote holder in the other MDBs. In voting
and negotiating loans and grants, the United States is the donor that has the most
demands and complaints, and is considered the least compromising (Babb, 2009; Sherk,
2008).
All of the MDBs analyzed in this thesis have a system of weighted voting, hence
giving the largest donor the most voting shares. This means that the U.S. holds
considerable power in decision-making. Figure 1 illustrates U.S. voting share in five
multilateral development banks.
Figure 1: U.S. Governance in MDBs (2006)1
G7
Voting
Share
(%)
42.9

U.S.
Voting
Share

Location of
U.S. Largest
U.S.
Headquarters Shareholder? “Veto”?

U.S.
Selects
President?

16.4

Washington

Yes

Yes

Yes

45.7

30.0

Washington

Yes

Yes

No

ADB

40.4

12.9

Manila

No

AfDB

27.5

6.5

Tunis

EBRD

62.6

10.0

London

Yes (tied with No
Japan)
No (second
No
after Nigeria)
Yes
No

World
Bank
IADB

No
No

Figure 1 shows that in all of the MDBs except for the AfDB, G7 countries (the
United States, France, Germany, the UK, Canada, Italy, and Japan) hold more than 40%
of the voting share. In all of the MDBs except for the AfDB the U.S. holds at least 10%
of the voting share and is the largest shareholder as well. Although this figure is from
2006, the power of the U.S. in MDBs has stayed overwhelmingly the same even now in
1

Babb, 2009, p.25 – source: Annual Reports, World Bank, IADB, ADB, AfDB, EBRD
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2014. According to the ―Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for
Congress‖ published in 2013, the U.S. voting share in the World Bank is 15.2% in the
IBRD, 10.7% in the IDA, and 22.4% in the IFC (Nelson, 2013). Additionally, the
numbers for the four other major development banks are: 6.6% (AfDB); 12.8% (ADB);
30.0% (IADB); and 10.2% (EBRD) (Nelson, 2013). Even with the worry of developing
countries taking a stand against the U.S. and having growing influence in the MDBs, U.S.
voting share has remained virtually untouched for almost eight years (Strand and
Trevathan, 2015). As depicted by Figure 1, although the United States annually dedicates
a significant amount more toward bilateral aid, it is still the largest shareholder in almost
all MDBs and other multilateral organizations. In the larger spectrum of money dedicated
to foreign aid, the amount the U.S. gives to participate in multilateral organizations is a
small price to pay for the benefits of participating in MDBs.
A prevalent question that arises in IR literature regarding U.S. aid to other
countries pertains bilateral versus multilateral aid. If the United States is going to support
a particular nation-state through the World Bank or a regional development bank, why
not funnel the money bilaterally rather than through a middle man? As stated previously
bilateral aid is still the dominant form of foreign aid when compared to multilateralism.
The U.S. tends to favor bilateral aid because it allows more control over where the money
goes and how the money is spent. The U.S. exercises more flexibility to allocate funds to
countries that are of strategic importance, but not facing the greatest development needs
(Nelson, 2013). It also allows the U.S. a more personal tactic of building a clear
relationship between it and the recipient country, garnering more goodwill from the
recipient country toward the United States (Nelson, 2013). Figure 2 shows U.S. Bilateral
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and Multilateral Official Development Assistance, 2000-Present in billions of dollars.
Historically, bilateral aid has outspent multilateral aid by the billions of dollars. In 2011,
bilateral U.S. trade was approximately $25 billion more than U.S. multilateral aid.
Figure 2: U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Official Development Assistance, 2000Present in billions of dollars2

A number of political scientists and economists have studied the benefits and
rationale as to why a powerful country such as the United States would opt for
multilateral rather than bilateral aid. Through MDBs, the U.S. has means to pursue and
shape the current conception of U.S. interests (Babb, 2009). There is a significant amount
of literature that refers to the United States as an ―Activist Shareholder‖ in financial
institutions (Park and Strand, 2015; Babb, 2009, 37). The U.S. uses the structure of the
MDBs, which heavily weighs in favor of larger, more developed countries, to set an
agenda for its own personal progress. Babb writes that the objectives for U.S.
2

Rebecca Nelson, 2013: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41170.pdf
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involvement in MDBs can be grouped into three categories: strategic, economic, and
humanitarian (2009). The U.S. uses MDBs to makes progress on its own international
agenda. Additionally, other works have found that factors such as bilateral trade relations,
recipient need, and regime type are robustly related to U.S. support for MDB loans,
meaning that the U.S. has been found to use MDBs to show support to its allies and
friends (Strand & Zappile, 2014). It not only does so for strategic relationship motives,
but also to show that it supports certain normative values, such as humanitarian needs.
Rodrik writes that in addition to strategic interests, the United States should be
interested in multilateral lending for two other reasons: information gathering and
monitoring as well as conditionality (1995). Multilateral lending agencies employ
thousands of analysts who closely follow economic developments and policies of
developing countries. They prepare detailed country reports, cross-country analyses, and
reports on specific economic sectors, among others which serve as important resources to
member countries (Rodrik, 1995). Additionally, conditionality on loans and U.S. power
to influence that conditionality make multilateralism attractive. The U.S. is able to add
conditions to particular projects and manipulate policies within another country by
withholding funding unless particular conditions are met first (Rodrik, 1995). The U.S.
can do this without making it seem like a political agenda since multilateral lending
institutions are less political (supposedly apolitical except for the in the case of the
EBRD, who has an open, pro-democracy agenda) and are able to funnel money through
this third party.
The involvement of the United States in MDBs faces harsh criticism. Although
the United States has decided to partake in multilateral lending, historically there has
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been reluctance on the part of the United States Congress to support MDBs. A major
reason for American reluctance to fully support MDBs is the structure of its political
system (Babb, 2009; Schoultz, 1982). U.S. foreign policy toward MDBs can be
described as caught in the middle between different views of the executive and legislative
branches of government (Strand and Zappile, 2014). The U.S. political system has a
legislative branch that is reliant on constituent issues and approval by national parties.
Therefore, the country’s domestic agenda is often more important in priority rankings
than foreign aid and international concerns. While it is up to the executive branch to put
together policy agendas in regards to foreign aid, the legislative branch still has the
capabilities to put a halt to any of these agendas such as the power to makes laws and
appropriate funds (Babb, 2009; Schoultz, 1982).
These powers give Congress huge influence over U.S. policies over MDBs. The
U.S. Congress has attempted many times to influence the decisions of the Treasury on the
grounds of financial oversight, and have attempted to dictate how U.S executive directors
vote in the MDBs through legislation (Strand and Zappile, 2014). Many members of
Congress argue that there is a lack of transparency in the MDBs and that the institutions
are wasteful and riddled with corruption, while others question how effective these banks
are in actually aiding developing questions, or if efforts are just being wasted (Strand and
Zappile, 2014). In general, member of Congress have been hesitant to fully support U.S.
participation in MDBs and really any type of collective action in an international
organization. As such, the U.S. Congress has attempted to do what it can to control U.S.
multilateral participation.
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One example of this is the Harkin Amendment passed in 1976 alongside other
acts passed in the 1970s which mandated that American executive directors voting in the
MDBs vote against loans for projects in countries that violated the human rights of its
citizens (Strand & Zappile, 2014). Another attempt to control U.S. action in MDBs and
push for particular policies within them is the Pelosi Amendment. According to a
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report written by Jonathan Sanford and Susan R.
Fletcher in 1998, the Pelosi Amendment, which was passed by the U.S. Congress in
1989, states the following:
[The Pelosi Amendment] requires U.S. Executive Directors at the World
Bank and all the regional multilateral development banks (MDBs) to
abstain or vote against any proposed action with significant environmental
effects if it has not received an appropriate environmental assessment, or if
the assessment has not been available to the Executive Directors and the
public for 120 days before a vote.
The Pelosi Amendment does not mandate that U.S. Executives to MDBs vote
against a project with detrimental environmental effects; only that the U.S. can only vote
on an environmental item if it has undergone environmental assessment. Theoretically,
even if a particular project was highly detrimental to the environment, the United States
could still vote for the project as long as it went through legitimate environmental
assessment through an MDB. The CRS Report evaluated the impact of the Pelosi
Amendment since its enactment. According to the CRS Report passing of the Pelosi
Amendment played a huge influence in why all MDBs have environmental oversight
units today (Sanford and Fletcher, 1998).
In a more recent attempt to oversee the MDB voting process, Congress passed
legislation in 2003 that required the Treasury Department to report to Congress how U.S.
representatives voted in the MDBs (Strand & Zappile, 2014). More specifically, the
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amendment to Section 581 of Title XV of the International Financial Institutions Act
mandated that the U.S. Treasury publicize all no-votes and abstentions to MDB projects.
Prior to the passing of this legislation, these voting decisions were not accessible to the
public. Additionally, the new legislation requires U.S. Executive Directors to the MDBs
to provide basic reasons for positions taken during voting (Braaten, 2012; Strand &
Zappile, 2014). Although the amendment did not specifically mention the publication of
yes-votes, in theory these items that were supported by the U.S. are publicized as well
(Strand and Zappile, 2014).
It is because of this legislation that it is now possible to analyze U.S. positions
taken in the MDBs. Due to the novelty of this information there is limited contemporary
research in which these data have been incorporated. This has sparked interest in the U.S.
role in multilateral development banks and its official positions concerning certain issues
such as human rights or in this case, the environment. The next section specifically
examines U.S. environmental aid and how it has historically performed.
Environmental Aid
U.S. Bilateral Environmental Aid
Since the 1980’s, the United States has been a leader in bilateral environmental
aid. It has expressed interests in a wide range of environmental issues, such as slowing
down the destruction of the rainforests, species extinction, prevention of ocean dumping,
protection of the ozone layer, among several other campaigns (Hicks et al., 2008).
According to the PLAID dataset, between 1980 and 1999, bilateral donors committed
$61.9 billion in environmental foreign assistance out of $735.2 billion of all aid given
bilaterally (Hicks et al., 2008). The United States was first in the 1980s in terms of total
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dollars in bilateral foreign aid to protect the environment. However, in the second half of
the 1990s, the U.S. fell to third in total environmental aid, falling behind Japan and
Germany. The table below displays U.S. environmental aid in real U.S. dollars in 2000:
Figure 3: U.S. environmental bilateral aid in U.S. dollars (2000)3

Rank Donor

1980-1984

1985-1989

1990-1994

1995-1999

1
2
3
4
5

$1,068,543,240
$1,407,349,821
$1,865,238,929
$275,821,108
$54,798,218

$1,943,895,506
$2,268,802,983
$1,953,915,168
$462,815,792
$241,554,890

$5,767,253,085
$3,970,845,601
$3,144,500,663
$1,032,409,962
$780,695,098

$8,852,993,035
$6,708,761,445
$4,465,172,287
$1,424,144,506
$1,112,516,103

Japan
Germany
U.S.
France
UK

Although the United States is ranked third in terms of environmental aid in
dollars, it falls to rank 7 when looking at the amount of environmental aid provided as a
percentage of its total aid portfolio. From 1980 to 1984, the United States only gave 5.3
percent of its total foreign aid portfolio to environmental protection as opposed to
Denmark which gave 11.2 percent. Denmark is used as a point of reference because of its
ranking as number one in environmental aid in dollars. From 1985 to 1989, the United
States gave 4.5 percent of its total aid portfolio in this category compared to Denmark
which gave 12.8 percent. From 1990-1994 the U.S. gave 7.9 percent in comparison to
Denmark which gave 19.8 percent, and finally from 1994-1999 the U.S. gave 11.2
percent of its total aid portfolio to environmental protection aid whereas Denmark led the
way with 21.9 percent (Hicks et al., 2008).
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was launched in 1961
as a major instrument of the U.S. to influence developing country governments during the
Cold War with non-military aid (Hicks et al., 2008). Here it is important to note that
3

(Hicks et al., 2008, 126)
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%
Change
725.5%
376.7%
139.4%
416.3%
1930.2%

USAID is an instrument of bilateral aid to poor countries for economic development; it is
not considered a multilateral agency (Babb, 2009). Before the 1970s, USAID addressed
very few environmental issues. After the U.S. Conference on the Human Environment in
1972, however, significant concern about environmental issues was triggered. After the
Rio Earth Summit, USAID altered many of its environmental programs to include sectors
such as urban pollution management and energy efficiency, moving beyond basic natural
resource management (Hicks et al., 2008). By 1999, the U.S. was by far the world’s
largest funder in environmental projects. According to the USAID Foreign Assistance
Fact Sheet for fiscal year 2012, the U.S. remains the world’s largest bilateral donor. It
obligates approximately $48.4 billion; $31.2 billion in economic assistance and
$17.2 billion in military assistance – to foreign aid (USAID, 2012).
Literature shows that the U.S.’s use of USAID as an instrument of environmental
aid reflects the importance of national self-interest in U.S. foreign aid policy. It is clear
that keeping the environment protected is in the best interest of the United States.
Mismanagement of the environment and natural resources by developing countries is a
threat to U.S. interests and security (Hicks et al., 2008). Additionally, it is shown that
supporting environmentally friendly endeavors is also beneficial for U.S. commercial
interests. As of 2008, the environmental goods industry was worth 300 billion dollars
(Hicks et al., 2008). It would be more harmful to the U.S. to not invest in an industry that
could benefit American business owners and markets greatly (Hicks et al., 2008).
Industries that are geared toward protecting the environment are growing as world leaders
realize that this is a priority. Implementing policies and providing aid to countries for
projects that might use equipment from U.S. manufacturers would be beneficial to U.S.
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businesses that are geared toward these industries. Of course some U.S. industries may
not benefit from ―green‖ development projects.
Multilateral Environmental Aid
There is debate in international relations literature as to how effective multilateral
lending has been in improving the environment. There is no doubt that the governments,
NGOs, and IOs of the world have reached a consensus in agreeing that funding
environmentally friendly endeavors is essential. However, there is very little evidence to
suggest that environment projects funded by donors have had a substantial impact on
improving environmental outcomes in the developing world (Buntaine and Parks, 2013).
According

to

Buntaine

and

Parks,

evidence

shows

that

externally funded

environmentally-focused projects are less successful in general than traditional
development projects (2013, p.66):
Previous research on environmentally focused projects has identified a
number of factors that may contribute to successful outcomes, including
the political commitment, institutional capacity, and governance quality of
the recipient country; the severity of environmental pressures in the
recipient country; donor-recipient contracting dynamics; project
characteristics; and civic participation in the recipient country
environment sector. Most of this research has involved case studies and
small-n methods. To our knowledge, no one has taken advantage of the
many standardized post-project evaluations produced by the World Bank’s
Independent Evaluation Group to examine the determinants of successful
implementation of environmentally focused projects.
There are scholars who question the legitimacy of the impact multilateral aid has
in terms of benefits to both receiving and donor countries. Multilateral aid agencies have
been described as ―institutional Frankensteins‖ that essentially do as they please totally
free from the control of sovereign nation-states, as well as intrusive and unaccountable
among other negative sentiments (Nielson and Tierney, 2003, p.244; Hicks et al., 2008).
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Despite such harsh criticisms, however, no one can deny the fact that multilateral aid has
provided a significant amount of funding to environmental projects. From 1980 to 2000,
multilateral agencies have provided developing countries with more than $75 billion in
environmental aid. In addition, five agencies were responsible for more than 90% of the
funding: the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and the Global Environmental Facility (Hicks et al., 2008). The
World Bank alone was responsible for anywhere from a third to half of all multilateral
aid for environmental projects. Within the time span of 1980 to 2000, multilateral
agencies made major increases in funding of environmental projects and together more
than tripled their funding (Hicks et al., 2008). However, it is important to note that
multilateral agencies still spent four times as much on projects that were likely to have
negative effects on the environment from 1980-1999 (Hicks et al., 2008).
MDBs and Environmental Regulation
As concern for the environment increases among citizens of the world,
governments, international organizations, and multilateral development banks have
adjusted to reflect the growing demand for environmental protection and conservation
(Gutner, 2002). The five major multilateral development banks surveyed in this paper
have undergone major changes in environmental policy and allocation of funds for
environmental loans over the years as concern for the environment grows. In a study that
included 15 donors (including the WB, ASB, AfDB, EBRD, and the IADB) conducted by
Hicks et al. (2008), it was found that environmental aid is a strongly concentrated sector
with approximately 90 percent coming from the World Bank and Global Economic
Facility, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the
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European Union. This section will briefly outline what these banks currently do on behalf
of environmental protection.
The World Bank: There is a growing body of literature on the World Bank’s role
in environmental policy and the environmental impact of projects it has approved in the
past. The World Bank’s interest in environmental issues increased as it began to measure
a society’s progress on social variables such as reduced poverty and improved standard of
living and quality of life (Mikesell and Williams, 1992). As governments direct more
attention to social objectives, issues of the environment also increase in importance since
quality of life can be directly or indirectly impacted by environmental projects.
The World Bank created its Office of Environmental Affairs in 1973 and was the
first multilateral development bank to appoint an environmental adviser (Mikesell and
Williams, 1992). It has often been viewed as a leader among international organizations
(IOs) in regards to matters of environmental protection (Park, 2010; Nielson and Tierney,
2003). Although it was a leader in terms of including an environmental staff and formal
process to ensure the environmental standards of projects, its effectiveness has been
questioned. Nielson and Tierney write that although there is a public perception that the
World Bank is more sensitive to environmental issues than other organizations, its
environmental staff lacks the budget or authority within the organization to monitor and
enforce compliance with the organization’s environmental guidelines (2003).
It is important to note that the World Bank is made up of several lending
windows: the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Development
Association (IDA), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Each lending window

24

serves a different purpose, for example the IFC finances private sector projects in the
developing world and advises businesses and governments in developing countries in
regards to the international financial system (The World Bank Group, 2013). The IDA
provides long-term loans at zero interest to the poorest countries in the developing world
and MIGA is mainly focused on providing investment insurance to promote foreign
direct investments in developing countries. The most established lending window, the
IBRD, ―lends to middle-income and creditworthy low-income governments at low costs‖
(The World Bank Group, 2013). According to the World Bank’s Environmental
Overview (2014) between the IBRD and IDA, $31.8 billion was contributed between
2004-2013 to support investments in the environment and natural resource management.
Of the $31.8 billion, $7.7 billion was contributed by the IDA.
Additionally, in 1991 the World Bank helped to create the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) to promote environmentally sustainable development and provide funding
to regional and local projects with global environmental benefits. Currently, the GEF is a
global partnership among 182 countries, international institutions, MDBs, NGOs, and
other organizations within the private sector. According to the World Bank, through its
two major lending windows the IBRD and IDA, committed loans for $31.8 billion, from
which IDA’s contribution was $7.7 billion, to support investment in environment and
natural resource management from 2004 and 2013 (The World Bank, 2014). The World
Bank’s largest investment in environmental projects is centered on climate change, but
the institution reports that 15 percent of its environment and natural resource
management commitment goes to ―environmental policy and institutions for improving
governance and strengthening environmental policy and natural resource management‖
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(The World Bank, 2014). While climate change is the largest environment and natural
resource management area, 25 percent of funds go to water resources management and 21
percent generally goes to pollution management and environmental health projects.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB): The IADB was created out of a
demand from Latin America to have a regional financial institution that South and
Central American countries could turn to, despite U.S. opposition for several years on the
basis that a regional bank was not necessary due to Latin America’s participation in both
the World Bank and the IMF (Tussie, 1995; Mikesell & Williams, 1992). Latin American
countries felt as though institutions like the WB and IMF were more favorable and
generous to European countries. Latin American countries faced unreasonable
stipulations tied to loans and slow service (Mikesell & Williams, 1992). The United
States has exercised significant power in the IADB, despite the fact that the
organization’s president has always been Latin American. Non-regional donors such as
the United States and Canada hold 46 percent of the votes in the IADB. As in the case
with other regional development banks, the IADB was late to the game in forming a
legitimate policy to address environmental issues. It wasn’t until 1979 that the Bank
approved any kind of operational policy to oversee environmental activity (Mikesell &
Williams, 1992).

However, in recent years the Bank has shown tremendous

improvement in terms of handling environmental and sustainability projects.
The IADB ensures that all of the projects financed through the Bank include
―rigorous social and environmental safeguards and sustainability measures‖ (IADB,
2014). Additionally, the IADB is a partner of the GEF. According to the IADB-GEF
portfolio (2014) as of November 2012, the current IDB’s portfolio is comprised of 42
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projects with the total amount of $240.6 million in GEF grants. These projects range from
dealing with issues of biodiversity (i.e. marine and coastal conservation, protected areas,
and ecosystem management), issues of climate change (i.e., energy efficiency, renewable
energies and carbon markets), issues of international waters, and projects with multiple
focus points such as projects related to land degradation and watershed protection, among
others (IADB, 2014).
The Asian Development Bank (ADB): As in the case with other regional
development banks, the ADB was born out of a demand from Asian countries after
World War II to have some kind of regional institution to help develop strong trade
partnerships with large economics such as Japan (Mikesell & Williams, 1992). With the
passing of the 1963 resolution by the United Nations known as the Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the ADB was created and operations began in 1966
(Kappagoda, 1995; Mikesell & Williams, 1992; Hicks et al., 2008). Three years after the
IADB began recognizing the importance of some sort of policy to monitor environmental
activities the ADB realized the importance of such issues and appointed an environmental
specialist in 1981. However it would not be until several years later that an actual review
system of environmental guidelines for projects was implemented (Mikesell & Williams,
1992). Despite its efforts, the ADB’s Environmental Unit has often been criticized for
being too small hence leading to its lack of effectiveness in implementing environmental
considerations to all lending projects, and for not doing enough to combat climate change
in general (Mikesell & Williams, 1992; Hicks et al., 2008).
Historically, the ADB has centered itself on agricultural projects and rural
development, but has recently moved toward poverty reduction (Hicks et al., 2008). From
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the 1980s to the 1990s, the Bank’s funding for environmental projects tripled, going from
$2.56 billion to $7.54 billion, however, the Bank has always provided more money to
―dirty‖ projects over environmental ones (Hicks et al., 2008, 199). ―Dirty‖ projects are
those that concern industries that may have harmful effects on the environment such as
mining and oil. As the issue of environmental protection and climate change popularizes
on the contemporary political agenda, however, the ADB has paid more attention to
projects concerning the environment. The most recent numbers the ADB provides on its
website are from 2012. In this year, 53 projects totaling in more than $6.2 billion were
focused on environmental sustainability (Asian Development Bank, 2013). The number
of environmental sustainability projects approved by the ADB in 2012 pushed up the
proportion of these projects to 45% from 2010 to 2012, which exceeded the ADB's 3-year
rolling average target of 25% from 2010 to 2012 (Asian Development Bank, 2013).

The African Development Bank (AfDB): What is unique about the AfDB is that it
was established without the assistance of developed countries and was independently
created by African governments (English and Mule, 1996; Mikesell & Williams, 1992;
Mingst, 1990). At its inception, membership to the AfDB was open to only African
countries. This, however, proved to be difficult to maintain due to its limitation on
resources. Ultimately, the bank opened up its membership to non-regional members
(Mikesell & Williams, 1992). According to the AfDB’s Environmental and Social
Assessment Procedure guide, the bank did not set up a set of environmental procedures
until 2001. The (AfDB) joined the GEF in November 2003 as an Executing Agency,
which allowed it direct access to GEF resources (African Development Bank, 2014).
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According to the AfDB website (2014) the Bank’s number of projects in climate change,
biodiversity and land conservation, and international waters has increased over the past
few years. Equally increasing is the demand for projects that protect the environment and
promote sustainable development, which the AfDB recognizes and attempts to
accommodate by increasing its number of environmental projects. The AfDB writes
(2014) that through its partnership with the GEF, the Bank has becomes an important
source of funding and technical expertise for countries in Africa with limited resources to
finance such projects. Additionally, the AfDB has helped its regional members secure
$25 million of projects which were funded through resources contributed by GEF
(African Development Bank, 2014).
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD): Having been
established in 1990, the EBRD is the youngest of the regional development banks. The
Bank’s principle goal was ―to advance market values in former Eastern Bloc countries
(Strand, 2003, 115). With its headquarters in London, the EBRD is similar in structure to
the other regional development banks; however, it is also unique for several reasons.
Unlike the other MDBs, the EBRD is open and explicit in its concern with the
advancement of a political agenda – that is attempting to influence former Communist
countries with democratic values and ideals (Strand, 2003). Additionally, the EBRD
differs from other MDBs in that non-regional members have strong influence in decision
making, as well as in regard to how embedded it is in well-established European
institutions such as the European Union (EU) (Strand, 2003).
Due to the Bank’s youth, it was never thought to be late per say in terms of
paying attention to environmental considerations of projects like the other MDBs. The
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first version of an environmental policy and procedural document for the EBRD was
published in 1992, only two years after the Bank was established (EBRD, 2011).
According to the EBRD’s 2012 Sustainability Report, the Bank’s Environmental and
Social Policy ―requires that all projects are assessed, structured and monitored to ensure
that they are environmentally and socially sustainable, respect the rights of affected
workers and communities, and are designed‖ and operated in compliance with applicable
regulatory requirements and international good practice (EBRD, 2012, 4). The Bank’s
Environmental and Social Policy was last updated in 2008. According to the document
―The EBRD and the Global Environment Facility,‖ since 2004 the EBRD has partnered
with the GEF, a multilateral donor organization that promotes sustainable and
environmentally friendly development (EBRD, 2011, 1). Through this partnership, the
EBRD has been able to fund green projects such as providing an Environmental Credit
Facility for water pollution reduction in Slovenia (€10 million grant) and creating
markets for renewable power in Ukraine (US$ 8.45 million) (EBRD, 2011, 1).

III. Data and Methods
Theoretical Framework
As indicated in the literature review, United States foreign policy is influenced by
strategic interests such as assisting allies while inconveniencing enemies/ competitors, as
well as normative interests such as humanitarianism and environmental protection. The
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literature review shows that there has been considerable research in this area, but the
question remains: what is the importance of achieving these goals while making decisions
in the MDBs? Although officially the United States has, in recent years, identified
environmental protection as a major priority, does its voting action in multilateral
development banks echo these sentiments? Or does the United States go against its public
statements on protecting the environment by funding countries with a poor environmental
protection index and sustainability track record? Does it matter what type of project it is
that the U.S. is funding, whether it is mining or oil (i.e. dirty environmental projects) or
―clean‖ projects such as those regarding solar energy or water conversation?
As Braaten (2012) points out, the line between strategic and normative interests is
often blurred, especially when it comes to environmental protection. After all, it could be
possible for the value of protecting the environment to also be economically strategic for
the United States. It can be argued that both are so inextricably intertwined that they work
together to advance each other. Joseph Nye argues that power can be used to created
favorable policy outcomes and that sources of this power can be found in the values of a
country (2004). This means that U.S. values such as environmentalism create a soft type
of power that allows the U.S. to achieve its goals.
The theoretical framework Braaten uses was created as an explanation for U.S.
asylum enforcement by Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004), which explained why the U.S.
would choose to grant asylum to applicants from particular countries at certain times and
for what reasons. It is noted that there is a stark difference between asylum granting and
multilateral aid policy; however both reflect normative and strategic interests as their
underlying factors. It is relevant to use this model because it will emphasize the relative
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importance of normative and strategic interests in determining the position of
environmental protection in U.S. foreign policy, as it did for Braaten (2014) and human
rights in U.S. foreign policy.
Braaten (2014; 2012) uses a four-quadrant matrix that puts certain strategic
interests against human rights; in this case, it will be against environmental protection.
Using this framework, we can create an axis that places U.S. votes in the MDBs along
two axes: environmental protection and strategic interests. Strategic interests are
comprised of helping allies and promoting U.S. economic prosperity (Braaten, 2012). On
the strategic axis the area to the right is given a positive value, meaning the country is
strategically important to the U.S., and as such, the U.S. is most like to support proposals
to that country. The negative end to the left suggests that the U.S. does not have any
notable strategic interests invested in that country, and will be more likely to decline
proposals to that country (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Strategic versus Normative Motive Matrix
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This model creates four quadrants in which countries that seek MDB funding can
be placed, displayed in Figure 4. Countries in the upper right quadrant are of strategic
importance to the United States and also have had a positive environmental protection
performance. Countries that fall into the upper left quadrant are not strategically
important to the United States, but have a record of good environmental protection
policy. The countries that fall in the lower left quadrant are not strategically important to
the U.S., nor do they perform well in protecting the environment. Lastly, countries that
are placed in the lower right quadrant have poor environmental protection policy, but are
still strategically important to the United States.
From this we can make many assumptions. First we can assume that the United
States will most likely support funding for countries that are both strategically important
as well as environmentally friendly. We can also assume that the United States will vote
no on projects to countries that do not have a positive environmental record nor are they
strategically important to U.S. interests. For countries that are not important to U.S.
strategic interests but have a positive environmental protection policy, it cannot really be
assumed how the U.S. might vote on proposals for these countries. Other factors, such as
the size of the loan of type of project it will go to may play an important role in how the
U.S. votes.
It is in the final quadrant where the results of how the U.S. votes most interesting.
In this quadrant there are countries that have poor environmental protection policy but are
strategically important to U.S. interests. As an advocate for greener policies, stopping
climate change, and protecting the environment, it would be hypocritical for the U.S. to
fund countries that may use the funds for projects or support a country that is not
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considerate of the environment. However, it would be in the U.S.’s best interests
strategically, whether it is economically or politically, to approve proposals from these
countries due to their strategic significance to the country. From this theoretical
framework, hypotheses can be derived and tested.
Hypotheses
Following Braaten’s model and using the theoretical framework as a basis, two
types of hypotheses can be derived: those that test normative claims such as
environmental protection policy, human rights record, etc., and those that test strategic
interests such as U.S. geostrategic interests, including economic relationships. The
following are the hypotheses that were tested:
H1: The United States will be less likely to vote in favor of proposals by
countries that have low environmental protection ratings in the MDBs
H2: The United States will be less likely to vote in favor of countries that
have poor human rights records in the MDBs
H3: The United States will be more likely to vote in favor of countries that
it has strong bilateral trade relationships with in the MDBs
H4: The United States will be less likely to vote for a ―dirty‖
environmental project in general
H5: The United States will be less likely to support a proposal to a country
that it does not share similarities with in U.N. voting behavior
H6: Finally, I hypothesize that the United States will be less likely to
approve loans to countries in general during the Bush administration in
comparison to the Obama administration.
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―Dirty‖ environmental aid is considered to be financial assistance that
goes to projects that support environmental projects that can be harmful to the
environment such as mining and oil industries. This is in opposition to ―green‖ or
clean environmental aid which fund projects dealing with biodiversity, stopping
climate change, protecting international waters, minimizing land degradation,
protecting the ozone layer, etc.
Data Description
The loan review data used in this study is provided by the U.S. Treasury
Department. The data set covers the years 2004 to 2011, and shows how U.S. Executive
Directors voted on proposals in MDBs since January 2004. To proposals are
overwhelmingly loans mixed with grants and non-financial requests. This data set
contains 10,271 observations of U.S. votes in MDBs from 2004 to 2011 and deals with
the five major MDBs, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African
Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development, as well as two multilateral organizations that are not
considered MDBs, the Global Environment Facility, and the International Fund for
Agricultural Development.
The data covers 149 different countries, excluding territories such as the Cook
Islands, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Canary Islands. From 2004-2006 Serbia
and Montenegro were considered the same state (commonly known as the former
Yugoslavia), but from 2007 onward they are considered separate in terms of votes in the
MDBs (Braaten, 2012). Serbia and Montenegro were excluded from this study.
Additionally, there is a ―regional‖ category as well as the occasional ―world‖ category,
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which include votes on proposals that involved more than one country or region. These
projects were excluded from this study.
The United States can vote one of three ways on a proposal: yes (indicating
support), no (indicating disapproval), or abstention (indicating some conflict of interest or
a lack of knowledge of a particular proposal in voting). When the United States opposes,
abstains, or approves a proposal, it is supposed to assign that proposal with a reason code
as to why executive directors in the MDBs voted the way they did. The full key to the
vote codes can be found in Appendix A. Of the 68 reason codes given by the Department
of the Treasury, three codes pertain to the environment. Reason codes #9 and #16 pertain
to the Pelosi Amendment and issues in environmental reporting of the proposal. Reason
code #62 describes proposals that have a significant impact that could be compromising
to the environment, but that compromise has been or is in the process of mitigation. The
explanations for these three codes are as follows:
Figure 5: Environmental Reason Codes4

Code #

Explanation

9

Environmental reporting (P.L. 101-240, Sec. 521, as amended by P.L. 105118, Sec.

16
62

560(b)(3) and by P.L. 108-447, Foreign Operations 2005, Sec. 793)
Other environmental reporting (e.g., Treasury policy votes not specified in
#9 above).
Project could have significant environmental impacts, but such impacts have
been mitigated. Development outcomes expected to be broadly positive.

The data display which reason code the United States cited for each item if a code
was provided. Out of all the proposals, there are 289 proposals that cited environmental

4

United State Department of Treasury (2011)
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codes (meaning they used 9, 16, 62 or a combination of any two or three). In addition, the
word ―Pelosi‖ was used to identify projects that had used an environmental code as well,
referencing the Pelosi Amendment. Various projects did not provide a number code, but
instead made reference to the Pelosi Amendment and inadequate environmental
assessments. Proposals that referenced any of these codes were coded with a (1) while
any other project was coded with a (0). Additionally, the data on MDBs displays whether
or not any code was cited at all by the United States in a vote. Items without a code
provided are given a (0) while items that cite any of the 68 reason codes at all are given a
(1). Items that have either no code or cite any other code that is not 9, 16, and 62 are
given the code 0 also.
The voting data are published by the Treasury Department on its website (2011).
These original data includes the title of the project that was voted on, the amount of the
loan, how the United States voted on each item, and a reason code for why the U.S. voted
how it did (if one was provided). In the data set used for this analysis, 1,079 projects were
under the ADB, 663 were under the AfDB, 1,279 were under the EBRD, 101 under the
GEF, 2,005 were under the IADB, 128 were under the IFAD, and 5,002 were under the
WB. There were 48 different lending windows within these banks represented in the
projects requests, with 212 projects not specifying which window was used. There were
9,429 projects coded with 1, meaning that the U.S. voted ―yes‖ on these projects, 221
projects coded with a -1 meaning that the U.S. voted ―no‖ on the project, and 784
projects coded with 0 meaning that in those cases, the U.S. abstained.
Variables
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The dependent variable is how the U.S. voted in the MDBs. ―Yes‖ expresses U.S.
approval of a project while ―no‖ and ―abstain‖ were collapsed together into a single
category because both answers indicate U.S. lack of support for a project. The ―yes‖
votes are coded as (1) while the no/ abstention votes are coded as (0). The size of the
project, in U.S. dollars, may also impact U.S. support or opposition and is measured in
real terms (AMOUNT), dummy variables are also defined for which of the two major
American political parties had a president in office at the time of the proposal (PARTY)
and projects directed to China (CHINA). Others who have worked with these data have
often controlled for China in some way, whether it be through including it as a dummy
variable or running a model without China’s projects (Strand and Zappile, 2013; Braaten,
2013). Strand and Zappile found that their trials indicated the possibility of unit effects
due to China’s position as an outlier, and suggested a particular need to control for China
(2013).
The following variables were also used to address strategic interests: real gross
domestic product per capita ((ln)GDPPOP), trade relationships between the United States
and recipient countries through the sum of imports and exports ((ln)TRADE), and
recipient countries voting similarities with the United States in the United Nations
General Assembly (UNVOTE). GDP per capita data were provided by the World Bank
Indicators Data from various years and trade data is provided by the IMF Direction of
Trade Statistics, also from various years. According to Braaten, voting similarity in the
UN General Assembly is commonly used to determine how close countries are politically
(2013). I used the General Assembly Affinity Scores provided from a study by Strezhnev
and Voeten conducted in 2013 for data on recipient countries GA voting similarity with
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the United States. The computed voting similarity by using 3 category vote data (1 =
―yes‖ or approval for an issue; 2 = abstain, 3 = ―no‖ or disapproval for an issue) where an
abstention is counted as half-agreement with a yes or no vote (Strezhnev and Voeten,
2013).5 To deal with large differences in scale amongst the countries in the dataset, trade,
GDP, and other variables are transformed using a natural log function.
Normative values tested are a country’s human rights ratings as well as
environmental performance. Human rights ranking is denoted by (HuRIGHTS). These
data were collected from the Freedom House Index (various years), which breaks the
measurement down into two indicators: political rights and civil liberties of a country. A
thorough breakdown of this measurement is provided in the Variable Code Definitions,
but a basic explanation is articulated in this section. Freedom House Index has a
numerical rating for political rights based on a 1 to 7 scale (Freedom House Index).
Underlying those ratings are more detailed assessments of country situations based on a
40-point scale. The political rights questions are grouped into three subcategories:
Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation, and Functioning of Government.
Similarly, Freedom House Index has a numerical rating for civil liberties based on a 1 to
7 scale. Underlying those ratings are more detailed assessments of country situations
based on a 60-point scale. The civil liberties questions are grouped into four
subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational
Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (Freedom House

5

It should be noted that the UN General Assembly Affinity Score are calculated using a
differing method from how U.S. votes in MDBs are calculated in this thesis. The UN
General Assembly Affinity Scores used divides ―yes,‖ ―no,‖ and ―abstain‖ votes into
three different categories of consideration. For this thesis, I combine ―no‖ and ―abstain‖
votes since both indicate disapproval, using two categories instead of three.
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Index). The average was taken from these two indicators to create a country’s human
rights rating.
Environmental performance is measured by four different independent variables
that were tested in different models. One variable seeks a macro-level explanation of U.S.
voting decisions based on environmental performance and three seek a micro-level
explanation of the dependent variable. The macro-level independent variable is
Environmental Protection Index ranking (ENV_INDEX). The micro-level variables look
at the data on the project level rather than country level and include: environmental
reason code as assigned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (ENV_CODE); dirty
environmental

projects

(DIRTY_PRO);

and

environmental

projects

generally

(ALL_ENV_PRO).
The first variable to be tested was the Environmental Performance Index of the
countries available, which is a joint project between the Yale Center for Environmental
Law & Policy (YCELP) and the Center for International Earth Science Information
Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University, in collaboration with the World Economic
Forum and support from the Samuel Family Foundation and the McCall MacBain
Foundation (EPI, 2014). The EPI ranking is constructed through the calculation and
aggregation of 20 indicators reflecting national-level environmental data which are then
combined into nine issue categories, each of which fit under one of two overarching
objectives (EPI, 2014). The different indicators, issue categories, and objectives are
outlined in Figure 6:
Figure 6: Environmental Performance Index Indicators

Environmental Health
40

Water & Sanitation

Access to
Drinking Water

Access to
Sanitation

Air Quality

Household Air
Quality

Air Pollution
Avg. Exp. T o
PM2 5

Air Pollution PM2 5
Exceedance

Health Impact

Child Mortality
Change of
Trend in
Carbon
Intensity
Global Biome
Protection

Trend in Carbon
Intensity

Ecosystem Vitality
Climate & Energy

Trend in CO2
Emissions per
KwH

Biodiversity &
Habitat

Natural Biome
Protection

Fisheries

Coastal Shelf
Fishing
Pressure
Change in
Forest Cover

Fish Stocks

Agriculture

Agricultural
Subsidies

Pesticide
Regulation

Water Resources

Wastewater
Treatment

Forests

Marine Protected
Areas

Critical
Habitat
Protection

(EPI, 2014)
According to the Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, the Water and
Sanitation category measures two indicators: access to drinking water and access to
sanitation. The data for this measurement were derived from the 2012 WHO/United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and
Sanitation (JMP) (EPI, 2014). The Air Quality issue category is characterized by three
indicators: air pollution average exposure to PM2.5, PM2.5 exceedance, and household
air quality (EPI, 2014). The data for these measurements were provided by Aaron van
Donkelaar of Dalhousie University, which provided the PM2.5 data, and the World
Health Organization, who provided the Household Air Quality data from its Energy
Database, which provides estimates of the percentage of households using solid, liquid
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fuels, gaseous fuels, and electricity (EPI, 2014). The Health Impacts category measures
the probability of death between a child’s first and fifth birthdays with data from the
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: World
Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision (EPI, 2014).
Moving into indicators that fall into the objective of ecosystem vitality, the
Climate and Energy indicator analyzes actions and access to energy relative to a
country’s level of economic development. The data for these measurements are derived
from the following:
Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions data come from the Climate Analysis
Indicators Tool (CAIT) 2.0 database provided by the World Resources
Institute. Data for the Access to Electricity indicator are from the
Sustainable Energy for All Initiative, a joint effort by the World Bank and
the International Energy Agency (IEA). The Trend in CO2 Emissions per
kWh of electricity generation indicator is developed from data provided by
the IEA (EPI, 2014).
Although it is important to note that the YCELP admits that there is no global agreedupon target for CO2 reduction, and that these measurements are meant to measure a
country’s ability to reduce the intensity of carbon emissions over time (EPI, 2014).
Biodiversity and Habitat tracks the protection of terrestrial and marine areas as
well as threatened or endangered species, and collects the data for all four indicators
(natural and global biome protection, marine protected areas, and critical habitat
protection) from the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) maintained by the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) World Conservation Monitoring
Centre (WCMC) (EPI, 2014). According to the Yale Center for Environmental Law &
Policy, ―the Fish Stocks indicator measures the percentage of a country’s total catch —
within its exclusive economic zone — that is comprised of species listed as overexploited
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or collapsed. The Coastal Shelf Fishing Pressure indicator assesses the total catch from
trawling and dredging equipment divided by the total area of each country’s exclusive
economic zone‖ (2014). These data are compiled and analyzed by the Sea Around Us
Project, University of British Columbia Fisheries Centre. Lastly, the ―Forests‖ indicator
measures the percent change in forest cover between 2000 and 2012 in areas with greater
than 50 percent tree cover and the ―Agriculture‖ indicator data are gathered from the
World Bank database of Nominal Rate of Assistance that measures agricultural subsidies
and pesticide regulation (EPI, 2014). Lastly, the ―Water Resources‖ indicator tracks how
well countries treat wastewater from households and industrial sources before releasing it
back into the environment (EPI, 2014).
EPI data are only available every two years starting in 2006, resulting in missing
data. Missing data are a common problem in social science research (Osborne, 2013).
According to Osborne it is common for large data sets to be full of legitimately missing
data especially if it’s a government data set (2013). The YCELP explains that there are
countries missing in the data because in order to be included in the EPI countries must
have data for all of the indicators included in the Indicator Framework (EPI, 2014). The
only exclusion to this is if an issue is considered irrelevant for that particular indicator.
The website gives the example of a landlocked country that does not have a coastline and
would therefore not have a viable fisheries industry to participate in the fishery indicator
(EPI, 2014). Therefore, countries were excluded because of insufficient data. The EPI
study is not performed annually because many of the indicators are not measured
annually, especially for developing countries. As a result, the odd-numbered years are
missing from this data set at random, because data was not left out on purpose; rather it
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was just not applicable. To address this, the method of mean substitution was used to fill
some of the missing data. For the odd numbered years, the average is taken of the year
prior and the following year. For example, any EPI data for 2007 is calculated by finding
the average of 2006 and 2008 EPI results. In order to lessen the potentially inaccurate
results of means substitution, another test was run containing only the years and
observations that were provided by the EPI itself.
The three other environmental variables are (ENV_CODE), (DIRTY_PRO), and
(ALL_ENV_PRO). Environment reason codes are provided by the U.S. Department of
the Treasury and indicate that the reason the U.S. voted a particular way on a project had
environmental oversight concerns giving us the environmental reason codes that can be
used to test ENV_CODE. The variable ALL_ENV_PRO is used to differentiate projects
that are environmental in nature against other projects. There is no clear definition as to
what constitutes an environmental project and what does not. All MDBs have some form
of environmental assessment to safeguard a project’s potential effect on the environment.
For example, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank require all projects to go
through an environmental assessment prior to bringing that project up to a vote.
To create a threshold to define environmental projects, I used the GEF definition
of the types of environmental projects they fund, which is a pilot programme of the
World Bank. It provides funding for the following six areas: biodiversity, climate change,
international waters, land degradation, the ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants
(GEF, 2013). Because the World Bank was by far the largest multilateral development
bank taken into consideration in this study, its criteria used for dispersing funds in the
GEF were used to distinguish environmental projects from non-environmental projects in
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the datas. Those projects considered environmental contained any of the following key
phrases: ―conserv,‖ ―biodiversity,‖ ―water,‖ ―climate,‖ ―mining‖ and ―oil.‖ Mining and
oil were used to differentiate dirty environmental projects (DIRTY_PRO) to test H4.
The main research question addressed in this study is to what extent are U.S.
votes in the MDBs conditioned on recipient countries respect to environmental
performance? Even broader, what factors are influential in determining U.S. decisions in
MDBs in general? For example: is the U.S. more likely to approve a loan to a country
that it has better trade relations with, even if the project’s environmental impacts are
questionable? There are many research questions that this data set can answer.
Methodology
Utilizing descriptive statistics, I summarized the project-level data to explore
changes overtime. Next, I tested my hypotheses using logistic regression analysis (Logit).
This was due to the level of measurement of my dependent variable. Limited and
dichotomous dependent variables present problems in linear regression that use statistical
inferences; therefore a logistic regression analysis was used. Logistic regression can
transform non-linear relationships into linear relationships. This allows us to make valid
statistical references (Braaten, 2012). In addition, using pooled time-series cross-sectional
data often faces the issue of heteroskedasticity. Braaten defines heteroskedasticity as the
―assumption that all the errors have the same variance, or all the errors are independent
from one another‖ (Braaten, 2012, 75).To address heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors were used for more conservative estimations. All models used to test my
hypotheses included several control variables. Four models were run testing different
key environmental independent variables. There will be one core formula with variables
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was used for every model. The only differences between the models are the
environmental performance-related independent variable.
The first Logit equation was:
USVOTE = CHINA+ (ln) GDPPOP + (ln) TRADE + AMOUNT+UNVOTE +
HuRIGHTS + PARTY+ENV_Code
The second Logit equation was:
USVOTE = CHINA+ (ln) GDPPOP + (ln) TRADE + AMOUNT+UNVOTE +
HuRIGHTS + PARTY+ALL_ENV_PRO
The third Logit equation was:
USVOTE = CHINA+ (ln) GDPPOP + (ln) TRADE + AMOUNT+UNVOTE +
HuRIGHTS + PARTY+DIRTY_PRO
Finally, the fourth Logit equation was:
USVOTE = CHINA+ (ln) GDPPOP + (ln) TRADE + AMOUNT+UNVOTE +
HuRIGHTS + PARTY+ENV_INDEX

IV. Results
Descriptive Statistics
Figure 7 displays the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used to
test the dependent variable.
Figure 7: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
(ln) GDPPOP
(ln) TRADE
UNVOTE
HuRIGHTS
AMOUNT
PARTY

Obs
9848
9848
10227
10260
9103
10270

Mean

Std. Dev.
1.2
2.3
.01
1.6
12975.6
.5

7.5
24.6
0.3
3.6
5695.4
.4
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Min
3.98
17.4
0
1
3.4
0

Max
14.2
29.7
.74
7
375000
1

CHINA
ENV_CODE
DIRTY_PRO
ALL_ENV_PRO
ENV_INDEX

10270
10213
10270
10270
7025

5695.4
.1
.01
.06
62.47647

12975.6
.3
.5
.25
12.27376

0
0
0
0
25.7

1
1
1
3
90.45362

Logit Estimation Results
The results of the Logit analyses are show in Figures 8-11. The first model used
the core formula with the ENV_CODE variable.
Figure 8: Model 1 Results Testing Environment Code
Variable
CHINA
(ln) GDPPOP
(ln) TRADE
AMOUNT
UNVOTE
HuRIGHTS
PARTY
ENV_CODE

Coefficient
-2.363886
(0.000)
-.3065003
(0.000)
.0959398
(0.032)
-6.94e-06
(0.032)
-2.175015
(0.008)
-.2332119
(0.000)
.7980598
(0.000)
-2.73814
(0.000)

Number of obs = 9036
Wald chi2(8) = 121.86
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1665

In this model all variables are considered significant predictors of U.S. votes in
MDBs at the p<0.05 level. The model shows that if the vote was on a project for China,
the odds of the U.S. voting yes decreased by 2.36. For every one-unit increase in (ln)
GDPPOP, the odds of the U.S. voting yes decreased by .30 suggesting that the U.S. is
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more likely to say no to more developed countries. This makes sense since development
banks are supposed to assist countries that are still developing. For every one-unit
increase in (ln) TRADE the odds the U.S. will vote yes increases by .09. For every one
unit increase in UN Voting Similarity (using agree3un) the odds of the U.S. voting yes
decreased by .23 For every one-unit increase in Human Rights rating (indicating worse
human rights practices) the odds the U.S. would vote yes decreased by .23 If the project
was introduced during the Obama Administration, the odds of it being approved
increased by .79. Finally, for an increase in ENV_CODE (indicating that it was coded 1
showing that it was cited with an environmental reason code) the odds of the U.S. voting
yes decreases by 2.73 (which is to be expected).
Figure 9: Model 2 Results Testing All Environmental Projects
Variable
CHINA
(ln) GDPPOP
(ln) TRADE
AMOUNT
UNVOTE
HuRIGHTS
PARTY
ALL_ENV_PRO

Number of obs = 9036
Wald chi2(8) = 163.66
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1090
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Coefficient
-2.407584
(0.000)
-.2887743
(0.000)
.0899862
(0.038)
-.0000121
(0.000)
-1.922317
(0.013)
-.2355532
(0.000)
.5466349
(0.001)
.0389307
(0.860)

Figure 9 displays the results from Model 2. Here, all variables except for the
ALL_ENV_PRO variable are considered significant predictors of U.S. votes in MDBs at
the p<0.05 level. For the variables that are part of the core formula, many of the results
show similar relationships to the independent variable. Model 2 shows that if the vote
was on a project for China, the odds of the U.S. voting yes decreases by 2.40. For every
one-unit increase in (ln) GDPPOP, the odds of the U.S. voting yes decreases by .28. For
every one-unit increase in (ln) TRADE the odds the U.S. will vote yes increases by .089.
For every one unit increase in UN Voting Similarity the odds of the U.S. voting yes
decreases by 1.92. For every one-unit increase in HuRIGHTS the odds the U.S. would
vote yes decreases by .23 If the project was introduced during the Obama Administration,
the odds of it being approved increased by .54. Finally, the variable ALL_ENV_PRO was
not a significant predictor for U.S. votes in the MDBs.
Figure 10: Model 3 Results Testing Dirty Environmental Projects
Variable
CHINA
(ln) GDPPOP
(ln) TRADE
AMOUNT
UNVOTE
HuRIGHTS
PARTY
DIRTY_PRO

Number of obs = 9036
Wald chi2(8) = 187.21
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Coefficient
-2.44276
(0.000)
-.2854641
(0.000)
.0908831
(0.037)
-.0000122
(0.000)
-1.9331
(0.013)
-.2306127
(0.000)
.5409437
(0.001)
-1.735371
(0.000)

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1129

Figure 10 displays the results from Model 3 which uses the core formula with the
DIRTY_PRO as the main independent variable testing the importance of environmental
protection. Again, all variables in Model 3 are considered significant predictors of U.S.
votes in MDBs at the p<0.05 level. The model shows that if the vote was on a project for
China, the odds of the U.S. voting yes decreases by 2.44. For every one-unit increase in
(ln) GDPPOP, the odds of the U.S. voting yes decreases by .28. For every one-unit
increase in (ln) TRADE the odds the U.S. will vote yes increases by .09. For every one
unit increase in UN Voting Similarity the odds of the U.S. voting yes decreased by 1.9.
For every one-unit increase in Human Rights rating the odds the U.S. would vote yes
decreased by .23. If the project was introduced during the Obama Administration, the
odds of it being approved increased by .54. Finally, for a one-unit increase in
DIRTY_PRO (indicating that a project is more likely to go to an industry that is not
environmentally friendly) the odds of the U.S. voting yes decreases by 1.73, which was
not a result expected.
Figure 11: Model 4 Results Testing Environmental Performance of Recipient
Countries
Variable
CHINA
(ln) GDPPOP
(ln) TRADE
AMOUNT
UNVOTE
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Coefficient
-1.464577
(0.000)
-.1880622
(0.029)
-.0467791
(0.308)
-.0000112
(0.000)
-2.175015

HuRIGHTS
PARTY
ENV_INDEX

(0.008)
-.2800342
(0.000)
.5905259
(0.002)
.0140469
(0.080)

Number of obs = 6240
Wald chi2(8) = 170.93
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1077

Finally, Figure 11 displays the results from Model 4 which uses the core formula
with the Environmental Performance Index rating as the main independent variable
testing the importance of environmental protection. In this model, CHINA, (ln)
GDPPOP, AMOUNT, UNVOTE, HuRIGHTS, and PARTY are all considered significant
predictors in U.S. voting behavior in the MDBs at the p<0.05 level. ENV_INDEX is
significant at the p<.01 level while (ln) TRADE interestingly enough switched coefficient
sign entirely, contradicting the previous three models. This make (ln) TRADE the most
unstable variable of them all since the majority of the variables performed the same on all
models. The model shows that if the vote was on a project for China, the odds of the U.S.
voting yes decreases by 1.46. For every one-unit increase in (ln) GDPPOP, the odds of
the U.S. voting yes decreases by .029. For every one unit increase in UN Voting
Similarity the odds of the U.S. voting yes decreased by 2.1. For every one-unit increase
in Human Rights rating the odds the U.S. would vote yes decreased by .28. If the project
was introduced during the Obama Administration, the odds of it being approved
increased by .59. Finally, for a one-unit increase in ENV_INDEX, noting that the higher
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the rating on a 0-100 scale, the better a country’s environmental performance, the odds of
the U.S. voting yes increases by .014.
Interpretation
In conclusion, the hypothesis that environmental protection considerations
influence U.S. votes in the MDBs yielded mixed support. It was shown that the U.S. is
influenced on the project-level by how ―dirty‖ a project is. The U.S. was found to show
less support to projects that were classified as oil-related or mining projects, although
classification of an environmental project in general did not have significant influence on
U.S. voting behavior in the MDBs. The U.S. also gave consideration to environmental
reason codes provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, proving that if a project
failed to undergo environmental analysis or failed the analysis in any way, the U.S. is
more likely to disapprove of funding for that project. On the macro level, overall
environmental performance ratings of recipient countries were significant at the 95
percent level.
The human rights rating of a country was found to be significant across all models
and performed in the direction that was expected. As human rights ranking worsened, the
likelihood of the United States voting no on a project for that recipient country increased
as well. The significance of strategic indicators was also mixed. GDP per capita came out
significant with the same sign on the coefficient for all four models. As GDP per capita
increased, the likelihood of the U.S. voting in favor of a recipient country decreased. This
makes sense when considering the nature of development banks. They are meant to help
countries that are still growing and have not reached a level of mature development. This
could also tie in with the significance of China as a dummy variable. If a proposal was
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Chinese, the likelihood that the U.S. would vote no or abstain increased. It has been
argued that China should no longer receive aid from development banks because it is
highly developed and can be considered a ―rich‖ country. This is expected because the
two countries are known to be major adversaries in almost all issue areas, especially at
the UN on climate talks (Strand and Zappile, 2013; Ritter, 2014).
A recipient country’s bilateral trade relationship with the United States was an
unstable variable. Although it came out as a significant predictor of U.S. voting in MDBs
in the first three models, the last model switched the variable’s significance as well as the
sign of the coefficient. The first three models supported the hypothesis that increased
trade relationships meant the increased likelihood of the United States supporting a
recipient country’s proposal. However, the last model showed (ln) TRADE as
insignificant with a negative coefficient, suggesting that the as trade relationships
between recipient countries and the U.S. increased, U.S. support decreased. This could be
explained by the far small N-size of Model 4 as compared to the first 3 models. Because
ENV_INDEX did not include years 2004 and 2005, thousands of variables were left out
of the model and could have had an impact on the instability of (ln) TRADE.
UNVOTE was significant in all four models but did not perform as expected. The
hypotheses stated that the U.S. would be more likely to vote for a project if it had similar
UN voting in the General Assembly. This aligns with what Braaten found in his analysis
of UN voting similarity in his research (2013). The results showed that as UN voting
similarity between recipient countries and the United States increases, the odds that the
U.S. will vote in favor of the project actually decreases. It is interesting to note the
difference in who the U.S. votes with in different multilateral organizations. This
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difference in UN voting similarities could suggest that the U.S. does not necessarily vote
for a recipient state just because they have similar political ideologies within the United
Nations. Voting is also a formal process and this could show that the U.S. does not want
to show political bias in formal processes.
Finally, the AMOUNT of the project and the PARTY dummy variable came out
significant in all four models with the same coefficient sign. It is expected that the odds
of the U.S. voting in favor of a recipient country will decrease as the amount of the loan
increases. PARTY results show that across the board, the odds of the U.S. voting for a
project in general increased when President Obama was in session over former President
Bush. This is to be expected since issues concerning the environmental and
environmental protection tend to be viewed as liberal agenda items over conservative
ones.

V.

Conclusion

The Place of Environmental Protection and U.S. Foreign Policy
So where does this place environmental protection effort on the scale of U.S.
foreign policy? The main findings suggest that environmentalism does have an important
role on U.S. policy, although not a particularly prominent one. The study found that on a
macro-level of analysis, environmental performance of a country does influence how the
United States voted in the MDBs. When countries ranked better in environmental
performance, the United States was more likely to vote yes for that country’s proposal.
On a micro-level of analysis looking at the project-level, environmentalism’s significance
is less clear. The U.S. was more likely to show less support to a project if it was tied to
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mining or oil industries – two industries that are slowly disappearing as a shift toward
greener practices is occurring. Reason code also was a significant predictor of U.S. voting
behavior in the MDBs. If a project was given an environmental code proclaiming its lack
of environmental consideration through proper evaluation, the U.S. was more likely to
say no or abstain to that project. However, when looking at environmental projects as a
whole, there did not seem to be a relationship between how the U.S. voted and if a project
was environmental in scope. However, this could be interpreted positively to suggest that
the U.S. does not simply vote yes to all projects that are environmental but actually look
at the nature of that project and its implications.
An interesting conclusion can be drawn from the results of model 4. This model
used the macro-level variable of a country’s environmental performance rating as the
main environment variable. In the first three models with project-level variables trade
was significant. However, in the final model, when tested with the EPI rating, trade went
from significant to very insignificant. What might this mean? This could suggest that
when taken into consideration in the same model, the normative value measuring
environmentalism is a more significant influence in U.S. voting behavior that the
strategic interest of trade. In simpler terms, normative values played a more influential
role in determining how the U.S. voted over strategic interests in this model. This shows
that environmental protection, at least at the country level, does have influence over U.S.
voting in MDBs. The U.S. does take a country’s environmental performance into
consideration. In sum, both normative values and strategic interests performed well.
Areas of Further Research
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There are three major areas in which future academics may take this project for
expansion. The first would be to expand on this current project by adding several
variables. Although this experiment was modeled after Braaten’s project, this particular
study left out U.S. military aid to foreign countries as a variable (2012). This could be
added as another variable to measure U.S. ally-ship or could be an indicator of other
strategic interests that the U.S. might have. Other variables that could be interesting to
add is level of development of a country, regime type by country and across time, or even
to separate the countries by their top economic industries. All of these are variables that
could test certain strategic interests that U.S. might have in voting a particular way in
multilateral development banks.
Future academics could also analyze the influence of informal processes in U.S.
decision-making and its implication on environmental protection and foreign policy in
multilateral development banks. The research conducted for this thesis and the U.S. votes
contained in the data set are all examples of formal processes and numbers that can be
recorded and quantified. However, we know that the power of informal influence in U.S.
decision-making is undeniable, and oftentimes it is difficult to mark a distinct difference
between the two types of influences (Kilby, 2013). However, informal processes and
relationship between member countries are more difficult to study.
Finally, a study can be conducted on recipient countries that have received
multiple loans to assist the production of environmental projects. The improvement of
environmental performance can be studied to see if the approval of such projects is
actually contributing to the overall improvement of environmental performance of
recipient countries. It would be interesting if someone actually studied the impact of these
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loans to verify if they are strong influencers in the progress and environmental
performance of developing countries.
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Appendix
Item A: U.S. Department of the Treasury Reason Codes
Code
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

8

9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Reason
Economic and policy considerations
Surplus commodities (as defined under P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations
2006, Sec. 514)
Communist dictatorships (P.L. 98-181, Sec. 804)
Surplus mineral production (P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec.
514)
Expropriation (P.L. 103-236, Sec. 527); The assistance does not support
basic human needs.
Narcotics (P.L. 87-195, Sec. 490(a)(2) and 490A(a)(2), as amended by the
Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, by the International Narcotics
Control Act of 1992, and by P.L. 103-447, Sec. 101 and further amended in
P.L. 104-66, Sec. 1112(d))
Human rights (P.L. 95-118, Sec. 701, and amended by P.L. 101-240 Sec.
541(c), and P.L.102-511, Sec. 1008); The assistance supports basic human
needs
Human rights (P.L. 95-118, Sec. 701, and amended by P.L. 101-240, Sec.
541(c), and P.L.102-511, Sec. 1008). The assistance does not support basic
human needs.
Environmental reporting (P.L. 101-240, Sec. 521, as amended by P.L. 105118, Sec.560(b)(3) and by P.L. 108-447, Foreign Operations 2005, Sec.
793)
International terrorism (P.L. 104-132, Sec. 327)
Chemical and biological weapons production (Executive Order 12735)
Harboring indictees for war crimes (P.L. 107-115, Sec. 581(b-d))
Policy towards Burma (P.L. 104-208, Sec. 570(a)(2))
Cambodia (P.L. 108-447, Foreign Operations 2005, Sec. 554(a)); The
assistance does not support basic human needs.
Cambodia (P.L. 108-447, Foreign Operations 2005, Sec. 554(a)). The
assistance supports basic human needs
Other environmental reporting (e.g., Treasury policy votes not specified in
#9 above).
Nuclear material (P.L. 103-236, Sec. 823)
Palm oil, sugar, and citrus (P.L. 95-118, Sec. 901(a))
Serbia or Montenegro (P.L. 103-160, Defense Authorization, Sec. 1511(c)
and P.L. 104-208, Sec. 540)
Failing to apprehend war criminal indictees (P.L. 109-102, Foreign
Operations 2006, Sec.561(a)(1))
Worker rights, trade distortion, surplus capacity (P.L. 100-202, Sec. 406(1))
58

22
23

24

25

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35

36

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Female genital mutilation (P.L. 104-208, Sec. 579)
Sanctions for transfer or use of nuclear explosive devices (P.L. 103-236,
Sec. 826(a) as amended by Sec. 102(b)(2)(E)); The assistance supports
basic human needs
Sanctions for transfer or use of nuclear explosive devices (P.L. 103-236,
Sec. 826(a) as amended by Sec. 102(b)(2)(E)); The assistance does not
support basic human needs
Waiver of sanctions for transfer or use of nuclear explosive devices with
respect to India and Pakistan (P.L. 106-79, Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2000, Title IX, Sec.9001(a))
Expropriation (P.L. 103-236. Sec. 527); The assistance supports basic
human needs
IMF bailouts of banks (P.L. 98-181, Sec. 807)
Religious persecution (P.L. 105-292, Title V, Sec. 402, 405(12) and 422);
The assistance supports basic human needs
Religious persecution (P.L. 105-292, Title V, Sec. 402, 405(12) and 422);
The assistance does not support basic human needs
Serbia-Montenegro (P.L. 105-277, Sec. 514(b))
Cuba (P.L. 104-114, Sec. 104)
Sanctions on use of chemical or biological weapons (P.L. 102-182, Sec.
307)
Chemical weapons sanctions on disclosure of confidential business
information (P.L. 105-277, Division I, Sec. 103(e)(2)(A), Sec.
103(e)(2)(B)(iii) and Sec. 103(e)(3)(B)(v))
IMF Korea (P.L. 105-277, Sec. 602(a), (1998))
Transparency of budgets: audit of military expenditures (P.L. 104-208, Sec.
576 as amended by P.L. 105-118, Sec. 572); The assistance supports basic
human needs
Transparency of budgets: audit of military expenditures (P.L. 104-208, Sec.
576 as amended by P.L. 105-118, Sec. 572); The assistance does not
support basic human needs
Serbia (P.L. 106-113, Sec. 599(b)(1), (1999))
Serbia (P.L. 106-429, Sec. 594(b), (2000))
User fees (P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 562)
Trafficking in persons (P.L. 106-386, Sec. 110); The assistance supports
one or more specified exceptions
Trafficking in persons (P.L. 106-386, Sec. 110); The assistance does not
qualify under any specified exception
IMF programs and debt levels (P.L. 98-181, Sec. 806)
Failing to apprehend war criminal indictees (P.L. 109-102, Foreign
Operations 2006, Sec.561(a)(1)); Exceptions or waiver authority applies
USA PATRIOT Act on deterring international terrorism (P.L. 107-56, Sec.
360)
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-99)
Zimbabwe, as governed by P.L. 109-102 (Foreign Operations 2006, Sec.
572)
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47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
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63
64
65
66
67
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Serbia, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Sec. 563 (Foreign Operations 2006).
If Serbia is not certified.
Serbia, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Sec. 563 (Foreign Operations 2006).
If Serbia is certified.
India IBRD Water and Sewage, as governed by P.L. 107-115, Foreign
Operations FY2002, Title IV.
Tibet, as governed by P.L. 107-228, Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
FY2003, Sec 616(b).
East Timor, as governed by P.L. 107-228, Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, FY2003, Sec.633.
Sudan, as governed by P.L. 107-245, Sudan Peace Act section 6(b)(2)
(2002).
Burma, as governed by Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003,
P.L. 108-61.
Burma, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec.
526(a).
Iraq, as governed by P.L. 108-11, Sec. 1503, as amended by P.L. 108-106,
Sec. 2204.
Tibet, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 575(a).
Commodities or minerals in surplus on world markets (P.L. 99-472 of the
Export-Import Bank Act of 1986)
Copper exports, mines and mining (P.L. 99-88, Sec. 501)
Mining, smelting and refining (P.L. 99-88, Sec. 502, as amended by P.L.
102-285)
Commodities, products, or minerals for export (P.L. 100-202, Foreign
Operations, FY1987, Title XIV, Sec. 1403(b) of the IFI Act, as amended by
P.L. 106-36, Title I, Sec. 1002)
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-497)
Project could have significant environmental impacts, but such impacts
have been mitigated. Development outcomes expected to be broadly
positive.
Sri Lanka, as governed by P.L. 111-117, Division F, Sec. 7089. The
assistance supports basic human needs.
Sri Lanka, as governed by P.L. 111-117, Division F, Sec. 7089. The
assistance does not support basic human needs.
Palestinian Authority, as governed by P.L.109-446, section 8. The
assistance meets BHN and/or democracy support.
Palestinian Authority, as governed by P.L.109-446, section 8. The
assistance does not meet BHN or democracy support.
Belarus, as governed by P.L.109-480, section 6(e). The assistance meets
humanitarian needs.
Belarus, as governed by P.L.109-480, section 6(e). The assistance does not
meet humanitarian needs.
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Item B: Variable Code Definitions
Date – Day, month, and year the project was voted on
Year – (2004 – 2011) Year the project was voted on
Country – Name of the country that is requesting the loan/ grant
Population – Population of the country (adjusted for year). These data were collected
from the World Bank Indicators, which bases total population on the de facto definition
of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except
for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally
considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are
midyear estimates (World Bank, ―Population, total‖).
USExport – U.S. exports is nominal U.S. dollars (millions). Data are taken from U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign Trade. Data are from the IMF
Direction of Trade Statistics, various years.
USImport – U.S. imports in nominal U.S. dollars (millions). Data is taken from U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign Trade. Data are from the IMF
Direction of Trade Statistics, various years.
Total Trade – Total trade is determined by finding the sum of both imports and exports
in Columns E and F.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in U.S. $ - The World Bank provides GDP at
purchaser's prices, meaning it is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated
assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S.
dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year
official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not
reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative
conversion factor is used.
Freedom House Index Political Rights (PR) – Freedom House Index has a numerical
rating for political rights based on a 1 to 7 scale. Underlying those ratings are more
detailed assessments of country situations based on a 40-point scale. A country or
territory is awarded 0 to 4 points for each of 10 political rights indicators. The political
rights questions are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process (3 questions),
Political Pluralism and Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3). The
political rights section also contains two additional discretionary questions. For additional
discretionary question A, a score of 1 to 4 may be added, as applicable, while for
discretionary question B, a score of 1 to 4 may be subtracted, as applicable (the worse the
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situation, the more points may be subtracted). The highest score that can be awarded to
the political rights checklist is 40 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 10 questions).
Freedom House Index Civil Liberties (CL) – Freedom House Index has a numerical
rating for civil liberties based on a 1 to 7 scale. Underlying those ratings are more
detailed assessments of country situations based on a 60-point scale. A country or
territory is awarded 0 to 4 points for each of 15 civil liberties indicators. The civil
liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief
(4 questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal
Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). The highest score that can be awarded to the civil
liberties checklist is 60 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 15 questions).
Freedom House Index PR and CL Combined – A country or territory is assigned two
ratings (7 to 1)—one for political rights and one for civil liberties—based on its total
scores for the political rights and civil liberties questions. Each rating of 1 through 7, with
1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom,
corresponds to a specific range of total scores (see tables 1 and 2).
Free, Partly Free, Not Free Status – The average of a country’s or territory’s political
rights and civil liberties ratings is called the Freedom Rating, and it is this figure that
determines the status of Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0)
(see table 3).
Bank – This variable describes which bank the loan was requested through.








ADB – Asian Development Bank
WB – World Bank
EBRD – European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
IDB – Inter-American Development Bank
GEF – Global Environment Facility
AFDB – African Development Bank
IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development

Lending Window – This variable describes which lending window of a particular
development bank the loan was requested through.










ADB – Asian Development Bank
ADF – Asian Development Fund
AFDB – African Development Bank
AFDF – African Development Fund
EBRD – European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
FSO – Fund for Special Operations (IDB)
GEF – Global Environment Facility (WB)
IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IBRD / IDA – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development /
International Development Association
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IDA – International Development Association
IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC – International Finance Corporation
IIC – Inter-American Investment Corporation
IMD - International Institute for Management Development
ITF – International Transport Forum
Japan Fund
JCF - Japanese Trust Fund for Consultancy Services
JFPR – Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction
JSF – Japanese Special Fund
JTF – Japanese Trust Funds
KPRF – Korean Poverty Reduction Fund
Mexico Trust Fund
MIF – Multilateral Investment Fund
MIGA – Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
OC – Ordinary Capital
OC/SF – Ordinary Capital/ Special Fund
OCR – Ordinary Capital Resources
OCF/SF – Ordinary Capital Resources/ Special Fund
ODA – Official Development Assistance
PEF – Poverty and Environment Fund
PRCF – Poverty Reduction Cooperation Fund
Private Sector
PSO – Private Sector Operations
SEP – Social Entrepreneurship Program
SF – Special Fund
SRF – Special Relief Fund
TF – Trust Fund
WB – World Bank
212 do not specify a lending window
The following could not be found: GOV, IDB, IRBD, JTFCS, RSDD, SFO, SFR,
SP, UK

Project - title of project
Amount – dollar amount in nominal U.S. $ millions
Doc # - Document number as recorded by US Treasury
Vote - Numeric code for U.S. position; 1 = support, 0 = abstain. -1 = oppose
U.S. Position - US position as reported by US Treasury
Y/N Code - whether the project was given a reason code = 1; no reason code = 0
Environment Code - project given environmental code = 1; no environmental code = 0
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Party - dummy variable denoting change in party controlling executive branch; coded 0
for Bush and 1 for Obama (starting in 2009)
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